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 Front page image: an engraving named „The European State Jockies Running a Heat for the Ballance of 
Power‟. The chaotic situation depicted neatly represents the vague, dynamic definition of the balance of power, a 
contemporary political concept that dominated eighteenth-century political debate in Europe which is highly 
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Introduction 
If you were to stop a random Dutch person in the street, and ask him or her about Dutch 
history, there is a good chance that this person will mention the Dutch Revolt or the following 
Golden Age (Most of the seventeenth century, begin and end debated.) as some of the most 
important times in Dutch history. This is unsurprising: at school, the Dutch are taught that 
during the Golden Age, the Dutch Republic was a major power in Europe, perhaps even the 
most powerful state in Europe for a few decades. The Republic excelled in various ways, such 
as in the quality and quantity of her army and navy, her strong economy and her diplomatic 
abilities.  
 The idea that the Dutch Republic was a major power during the late seventeenth (and 
for some also the early eighteenth) century is shared by most academics writing about the 
Dutch Republic. The power of the Republic was composed of various elements. Of course 
there were the military or naval aspects. The Republic had earned her credit as a military 
power by breaking away from the Spanish empire, and would play a big role in many 
important wars after that. The Eighty Years‟ war (1568-1648) had forced the Dutch to 
develop good strategies and ways to fund an army and a navy. Because of this, the Republic 
was able to field large armies and fleets, even though her territory and population were quite 
small. Related to this is also the aspect of economic power. Trade all around the world was 
the most important sector of the Dutch economy. This strong economy allowed the creation of 
military power, and as a result of that, the Republic also possessed a lot of political and 
diplomatic power. Important peace negotiations were therefore often held on Dutch territory, 
such as in Nijmegen (1678), Rijswijk (1697) and Utrecht (1713).  
 However, clear as it is to most academics that the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth century was a force to be reckoned with, there is a major point of debate 
surrounding this subject about what seems to be a simple question: when did the Dutch 
Republic stop being a great power in Europe? The rise to power during the Revolt seems quite 
clear, and so does the zenith of power during the mid- and late seventeenth century. But the 
question about when exactly (for as far we can see that as a single point in time) the Republic 
fell from grace as a great power still knows no consensus. 
  Scholarly opinions on the matter vary wildly. Some say that already in 1672, in Dutch 
dubbed the Year of Disaster (Rampjaar), when England, France and two German states 
simultaneously invaded, that the Dutch supremacy was over. The Republic managed to 
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survive, albeit barely.
2
 Others place the beginning of the loss of her prominent position 
around the end of the century and the beginning of the next, after fighting numerous wars with 
France and being forced into alliances and war debt in the 1680s and 1690s. A popular 
moment or period mentioned for the decay of great power status because of these reasons is 
the Spanish war of Succession or the following Treaty of Utrecht (1713), where the Republic 
seems to have been mostly overlooked in the negotiations between France and Great Britain.
3
 
Still, some will say that the Republic‟s status as an important political or economic player 
dragged on much further, into the 1730s or even through the Austrian War of Succession, 
after which it truly became clear that the Republic no longer was a crucial player in 
international politics.
4
 By the time the fourth Anglo-Dutch war broke out (1780), a war in 
which the Republic suffered greatly, there is nobody left to defend the Republic as a great 
power. Next to these viewpoints, there are also some academics that claim that the Dutch 
Republic never even was a great power in Europe, although they seem to be in the minority.
5
 
 Because the Dutch Republic was seen as a great power in various aspects, the 
moments or periods when this great power decayed vary when considering these differing 
aspects. Scholars have sometimes made statements separating these aspects. For instance, 
Olaf van Nimwegen has argued that the Dutch land armies didn‟t really lose their significance 
in the European system until the Franco-Austrian alliance of 1756, while the relevance of the 
Republic‟s navy was long gone by then.6 These kinds of separations only complicate the 
debate further and make it even more difficult to point to a single point in time where „the‟ 
great power status was lost, because that power actually consisted of multiple aspects that 
decayed at different moments in time. 
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 Because of the extremely broad debate one gets the impression that something is 
lacking in our knowledge about the great power status of the Republic. Perhaps a shortcoming 
can be found in the contemporary opinion on the matter. Just like today, people back then 
were very much aware that the Republic was, at some point, an important power or a great 
power in Europe. Similarly, they were also aware that that status had vanished later in time. 
One only needs to look at the Patriot movement of the 1780s to confirm this, as one of the 
biggest resentments against the ruling class was that they allowed the country to slip into 
obscurity.
 7
  On an international level these kinds of considerations about states and their 
power also existed. In fact, a very influential political concept concerning this kind of thing 
was present in eighteenth-century Europe: the balance of power. 
 This concept, as will be explained later, was quite vague and undefined but still 
dominated many political debates. The concept first emerged in the mid-16
th
 century, but its 
popularity was highest during the eighteenth century. There are many aspects to this concept, 
but perhaps the most important is also the best known: that the balance of power served to 
prevent any European power from growing too powerful, in consequence rendering it capable 
of conquering or dominating the rest of Europe.
8
 Powerful aggressors were to be stopped by 
coalitions of lesser states, and two of the most important wars of the century, the Wars of the 
Spanish and Austrian Successions (1701-1713 and 1740-1748) were fought for the exact 
reason of preserving the balance of power.
9
 
 Of course, because the Dutch Republic was an important power during the same time 
frame, it is to be expected that she can be found somewhere in the discussions about the 
balance of power and European politics. Equally importantly, when the Republic started 
losing her significance, she must have disappeared from the considerations about European 
political affairs as time went on. Ida Nijenhuis has already found some evidence for 
something similar happening in contemporary writings about the Dutch Republic as a 
commercial power.
10
 Therefore, the sources left behind by these discussions could be very 
helpful in making a contribution to the historiographical debate described above. The 
contemporary perception is very important. We can ask ourselves what matters: does only the 
modern academic opinion on the power of the Republic matter, or should the perception of 
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the Republic herself and other European states back then also be taken into account? After all, 
the perception of the power of the Dutch Republic would also help determine her place in the 
balance of power and the European political system, not just how much military or economic 
power she could exert. 
 This tension between perception and “reality” can be linked to a contradiction between 
objectivism and social-constructivism. Duco Hellema describes these terms as follows. 
Objectivism is a way of thought about power that considers power to be measurable. 
Indicators of power are things that can have numbers attached to them. Simple examples are 
the size of a state‟s army, its economic profits, the military spending, or the extent of the 
state‟s territory and the size of the population. These kinds of arguments we frequently see in 
the modern academic debate, as we will see in chapter one of this paper. Besides these 
obvious measurements of power, there are also other perceptions of power that are not based 
on numbers, but are instead constructed by others. In this so-called social-constructivism 
many other things are considered that can make a state (seem) powerful as well. Examples are 
prestige from past achievements, a state‟s geographical situation, the political culture and 
structure, or the role played in the balance of power.
11
 Historians are not completely unaware 
of this social-constructivism. Paul Kennedy states that the Republic‟s geographical position 
played an important role in both her rise to and fall from great power status.
12
 Matthew 
Anderson describes how all objectivist calculations of power must have had some kind of 
subjective element, and he quotes the contemporary writer Charles Davenant, who said: 
„Opinion is the principal support of power‟.13 However, Anderson states that social-
constructivist ideas like these didn‟t gain as much traction as the objectivist ideas did.14 Still, 
something similar to these examples could be true for the Dutch Republic. Perhaps her 
prestigious past kept her perceived as a powerful state in Europe for much longer than 
objectivist reasoning would have. We already have some evidence of this. Great Britain 
frequently attempted to get the Republic involved in various conflicts in the 1720s and 1730s, 
considering her to be a force that could make a difference, while the Republic was highly 
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reluctant to do so because of her poor economic situation and self-perceived weakness.
15
 This 
may show that Great Britain thought of the Republic as capable of more than she truly was, 
thus judging her to be more powerful than the Dutch thought she was. 
 So, we might be able to make a crucial addition to the debate if we consider the 
contemporary perspective on the matter of the Dutch Republic as a great power, especially if 
we look into the underrepresented social-constructivism described above. The discussions 
about the balance of power are useful sources to analyze this.  Jeremy Black has described a 
variety of media the balance of power was discussed in. Already well known, according to 
him, are various kinds of treatises and essays written about the balance of power during this 
time period. Also important yet forgotten, he notes, are the personal communication and 
writings of diplomats.  Logically of course, these people were actively engaged in the 
discussions, determining and rebalancing the balance of power every time they were called to 
action. What is very interesting is that Black also notes newspapers as a valid source, 
especially if these were under governmental control or supervision. This would mean that 
many common people of the eighteenth century could have been aware of this concept of the 
balance of power and of the discussions surrounding it. This suggests that the discussion 
about the balance of power was well known to many people all over Europe. Therefore, there 
could have been a broad debate about it with many well-informed people partaking, making 
all these sources more meaningful and representative of a general opinion. Consequentially, 
there could also have been a broad awareness of the Dutch position within this balance of 
power, and also of when that position was lost.
16
  
Many options for sources are available, but for this paper we will mostly be sticking to 
the first category of sources. Still, this paper uses quite a diverse selection of sources: it is a 
mix of treatises, essays, books and published communications between various people from 
roughly 1700 to 1780. A crucial aspect is that these sources were publicly accessible. Most of 
the sources were for sale in (book)stores, according to their front pages. Although diverse, 
these sources all have something in common, namely that they in some way discuss the 
balance of power in Europe or the many things related to this such as wars, alliances, political 
interests of states and more (See figure 1, p9 for examples). The Dutch Republic and her role 
in these European affairs are often mentioned, which for us is a great way to find out how 
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much influence and power she had or was deemed to have by all these writers and thinkers. 
The sources originate from various countries and were retrieved from three online databases 
(see footnote for more details).
17
 Of course, for considering Dutch opinion on their power, we 
will use Dutch sources. For foreign or „European‟ sources we have English, French and 
German sources. The English sources make up the biggest part of the European corps, as they 
seem to busy themselves most with the discussions about balance of power, European politics 
and Dutch power. This is unsurprising, as Great Britain was of course allied to the Dutch 
Republic and actively engaged in maintaining the balance of power. French sources are fewer 
in number and focus a bit more on general European politics than on ongoing current affairs 
such as the Austrian War of Succession. Still, these hold valuable information about their 
perceptions of power of the Dutch Republic and what role she could play in the broader 
European system. German sources are few in number for this paper, only translated ones are 
used. The reason for this relatively small amount is the simple fact that otherwise this paper 
would likely exceed its envisioned scope. Still, some sources of German origin were included 
to rule out any extreme differences between those and the other sources. Interesting to note is 
that plenty of sources are translated from other languages, and that they also refer to other 
sources for claims they make. Some sources were written in response to other writings about 
similar subjects. This again implies that these sources were a part of broader discussions 
within Europe about the balance of power and its many related subjects. 
 All the considerations above already spell out the question this thesis will discuss. 
When did the Dutch Republic lose its status as a great power in Europe, if we take both the 
modern academic and contemporary opinions into account? This question entails a few 
different parts. First of all, the broad academic discussion that exists so far must be elaborated 
further and analyzed so that we can see what the modern debate consists of. What are the 
authors‟ arguments and points or periods in time considered for the loss of great power status 
for the Republic? Related to this, we need to find out what exactly „makes‟ a great power, or 
what gives a state power to begin with according to the modern academics in this debate. The 
concept of the balance of power will also be considered, because it is at the core of 
eighteenth-century political thought and many of the sources we will be analyzing. 
 Secondly, this question requires analysis of our sources, where we will try to answer 
similar questions. What made the Dutch Republic powerful or weak in contemporary eyes? 
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What kinds of things granted a state power back then? Would contemporary authors agree 
with our modern debate? As we will see later, the Dutch opinion and opinion of other 
Europeans on these matters were very different, which is why these will be considered 
separately. We will see at what moments these Dutch and foreign writers consider the 
Republic‟s great power status to be at an end, and why. 
To finalize, in the conclusion, there will be an attempt to achieve synthesis between 
the modern and contemporary debates. As will be shown below, there are significant 
differences between these debates. Why these exist will be discussed, followed by a 
conclusive answer about where contemporary authors placed the loss of great power status of 
the Dutch Republic. Following this will be some suggestions to solve the discrepancies that 
have been shown to exist between the modern and contemporary debates, which will 
hopefully help to conclude the debate about the Dutch Republic as a great power, and the 
definitions of power and great power in general. 
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Figure 1: Four typical treatises. From top left to bottom right, treatises of English, German, French and 
Dutch origins. Note the lengthy titles, especially the German one mentioning many different subjects. 
Many of these subjects are in some way related to the balance of power in Europe, again showing how 
diverse that term is and why the used corps of sources has such a diverse range of subjects. 
These sources can all be found in the source list at the end of this paper. 
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Chapter 1: From player to pawn. 
Modern perspectives on eighteenth-century state power, the Dutch 
Republic as a great power, and the balance of power. 
  
The main question of this thesis demands that several things from our modern debate are 
clarified. There are three general topics that will be discussed in this chapter: the Dutch 
Republic as a great power and when that status was lost, the definitions of power and great 
power, and finally the nature of the balance of power. First we will be looking at the debate 
about the Dutch Republic as a great power. We will consider the argumentations and 
perspectives of various scholars. What were the most important elements of Dutch power? 
When did the Dutch Republic no longer possess these elements of power? When was the 
Dutch Republic no longer a great power, and why was this status lost? Once this analysis is 
complete, we can start making some statements about the modern academic opinion on power 
and great power status, our second topic. What are the core elements of power according to 
modern scholars? Strongly related to this, then, is the question how the status of „great power‟ 
should be defined in the first place. What constitutes a great power? What requirements must 
a state fulfill for modern academics to see it as a great power? This definition has also been 
subject to debate, not seldomly in conjunction with the debate about the status of the Dutch 
Republic. Finally, we should also shortly consider the topic of the balance of power. How 
should we look at it? It is already known that there is no clear definition of the concept, which 
is and has always been the case.
18
 This paper will not attempt to give a clearer definition of 
the concept. It will only be explained and core elements of the balance of power will be 
discussed, which will help us better understand the contemporary discussions about the 
balance of power and the role the Dutch Republic played in it. 
If we eventually wish to achieve synthesis between past and modern perceptions of the 
Dutch Republic as a great power, it is very important to consider the large debate that has 
been going on around this subject.  Of course, important to us are the moments these authors 
consider to be the points or periods in time that the Dutch Republic lost her great power 
status. However, given the fact that the power of the Republic consisted of multiple aspects, it 
is also relevant to us to study the arguments the authors propose for their viewpoints on the 
matter. What elements of power did, according to them, make up the great power status of the 
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Republic? When did the Republic start losing these elements, fading away as a great power? 
Having a good overview of these arguments is very important if we wish to compare with the 
past, where there also have been certain perceptions of what exactly brought a state power or 
the great power status, which we will see in later chapters. 
To start us off, we have Olaf Mörke to argue for the year 1672, The Year of Disaster 
(Rampjaar), as the end of the Dutch Republic as a great power in Europe. In his article about 
the Republic‟s place between other European powers, he discusses the nature of Dutch power. 
According to him, the political power of the Republic was based off of her economic strength 
and the economic advantages she had over her competitors. This strength was also her 
weakness, according to Mörke. Damaging the economy would damage political power as 
well. France decided to do exactly this with trade embargoes, tariff lists and taxation of Dutch 
goods later in the seventeenth century. Because politics and economy were so closely 
intertwined in the Dutch Republic, this made France both an economic and a political enemy 
that was able to damage Dutch power whenever it desired to do so during the many wars 
around the end of the century.  
 Another way in which this relationship between the economy and political power was 
dangerous was related to the political structure of the Republic. Many regents were merchants 
and traders, who valued money over military prestige, unlike other European rulers such as 
Louis XIV. Therefore, whenever there was a time of peace, the regents immediately sought to 
decrease the power of the stadtholder and to reduce the size and expenses of the military. 
Instead, the regents focused on keeping the Republic out of conflict, which was most 
profitable to their business. This political course allowed France, England and the German 
states of Cologne and Münster to nearly overrun the Republic in 1672. 
Mörke argues that after 1672 the Republic could hardly play any important role in 
European politics because of these economic vulnerabilities and the reluctance to keep the 
military in a good fighting condition at all times. Dutch power depended too much on 
peacetime conditions. 
19
 Mörke thus looks at the problem from an economic and political 
perspective, blaming the loss of great power status on the growing incapability and 
unwillingness of the Republic to act and defend her economic interests. 
Quite a popular period in time during which the Republic is perceived to lose her great 
power status is during the Spanish war of Succession and the following Peace of Utrecht 
(1713). Perhaps a good place to start here is Victor Enthoven. Enthoven, much like Mörke, 
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blames the loss of great power status on the economic structure of the Republic. An 
interesting argument about economic dependence is presented. During the 80 years‟ war, 
Spain and the Dutch Republic were depending on each other for a lot of trade and profit, 
which helped finance the war effort on both sides. After the Münster peace, there again were 
favorable trading conditions for the Republic. The most important competitor was England, 
but there was no economic dependence on either side, so a trade war was hardly possible. 
England was unable to touch the Dutch trade supremacy that made her powerful. However, 
this all changed when France became an important market for the Dutch. Unlike earlier times, 
this relationship was one-way: the Dutch needed France to make good trade profits, but not 
the other way around. France sought and managed to exploit this, and was easily able to hurt 
the Dutch economy. The Dutch were unable to do anything about this. 
The situation worsened in the late seventeenth century because of trade restrictions put 
up against France, as a part of the agreements of the Grand Alliance that fought against 
France. The Republic still wanted to trade, as it was a necessity, but during the Nine Years‟ 
War and the Spanish War of Succession it was forbidden by the allies to trade with the 
enemy. Especially the navy was hit hard by these economic difficulties, as they were partially 
directly dependent on trade profits. This issue was one of the major reasons why the Dutch 
navy was lacking in numbers and strength during the Spanish War of Succession. Enthoven 
places the moment of the loss of great power status for the Republic somewhere during the 
Spanish War of Succession, although the above does seem to argue that already in the decades 
before this, Dutch power was quickly waning because of the economic dependence, growing 
trade barriers and all the problems that resulted from that.
20
 
David Onnekink looks at the problem from a diplomatic viewpoint. The War of 
Spanish Succession was going favorably for the Republic around 1710. Unfortunately for the 
Republic however, a major change in political course took place in the British Parliament, 
which soon started separate peace negotiations with France. The Republic was already having 
issues bringing together enough money to fight in the alliance, and would never be able to 
continue fighting France alone. Thus, there was a lot of pressure for peace talks, even though 
not all of the Dutch war goals had been met. Because of the Dutch dependence on Great 
Britain to continue any fighting, France no longer had to be as careful with her diplomacy as 
she had been while she was losing in the war, and started making more aggressive demands 
towards the Republic, bolstered by the prospect of Great Britain leaving the war. The war 
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itself and the Peace of Utrecht ultimately ended up being successful for the Republic, but the 
war had exposed some major problems: all things considered, she had been unable to follow 
her own political goals and had been crucially dependent on Great Britain to fight the war 
with France, and had been unable to do anything about Great Britain and France negotiating 
peace terms without including the Republic. In another article written by Onnekink he also 
explains that the problems caused by the Spanish war of Succession left such a sour taste in 
the mouths of the regents, that further participation in larger European affairs and risking 
another war was strictly avoided by neutrality politics.
21
 Onnekink summarizes the loss of 
great power status as being caused by internal political divisions, incorrect interpretations of 
English politics, and as a result being powerless and reluctant to follow an independent 
political course because of monetary and military shortcomings.
22
 
Frequently mentioned when talking about the decay of Dutch power after the Treaty of 
Utrecht are the debts the Republic accumulated during the Spanish War of Succession. Johan 
Boogman states that after the war, most of the income of Holland, the richest province of the 
Republic, had to be spent on interest payments for the war debts. As a result it was simply 
impossible to maintain an army and a navy big enough to play an important role in 
international politics. Forced neutrality then led to a lack of a common enemy for the 
Republic, which caused quarrels among the various provinces and regents, decreasing unity 
and hindering governmental efficiency, further weakening the Republic‟s military and navy. 
The Republic was formed by and owed its strength to a basis of war, and when that basis of 
war was exchanged for neutrality politics, Boogman argues, there was no way the Republic 
could survive as a coherent powerful state.
23
 
Moving on to the decades beyond the Treaty of Utrecht, we still see plenty of support 
for the great power status of the Dutch Republic.  Jonathan Israel acknowledges that after the 
Peace of Utrecht, the Republic‟s military power declined relative to other European powers. 
Her military spending returned to peacetime levels, in much the same fashion as had 
happened in the late seventeenth century at her zenith of power. Different this time around 
however was the fact that other European states maintained much larger peacetime armies, 
thus showing a relative decline of Dutch military power. True decline didn‟t happen until 
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much later, and throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the Dutch Republic was at 
least a „middle-ranking power of considerable importance in European and world affairs.’24 
Thus, Israel argues for a relative decline that in the first few decades of the eighteenth 
centuries kept the Republic up with the great powers, after which further decline changed that 
reality. 
Another supporter of a late loss of great power status is William Doyle. He also 
emphasizes the relativeness of the decay of Dutch power, arguing that the Dutch economy and 
Dutch credit remained significant players on the international stage until at least the 1730s. 
Signifying of still being powerful during the war of Spanish Succession, he talks about the 
large contribution of troops the Republic gave the alliance during the War of the Spanish 
Succession. As a symptom of decreasing significance Doyle speaks about neutrality politics 
playing an important role after the Peace of Utrecht, with the exception of the Austrian war of 
Succession, in which the Republic „gained nothing that could not have been secured by 
neutrality.‟25 The only beneficial outcome from the war was that France was temporarily 
exhausted and could no longer pose a threat, allowing the Republic to once again focus on 
trade instead of conflict. However, this would prove detrimental as it caused an alienation 
from England, which would eventually result in the disastrous Fourth Anglo-Dutch war.
26
 
Olaf van Nimwegen argues that the relevance of the Dutch Republic as a military 
force on land didn‟t end until 1756. During the Austrian war of Succession the Republic still 
played a very important role, at one point even managing to raise an army of 90,000 to fight 
for the alliance, although at a gigantic cost. The relevance of the year 1756 in the loss of great 
power status is because in 1756 Austria made an alliance with France, which nullified the 
significance of the barrier fortresses the Republic had in the Austrian Netherlands. 
27
 In the 
years before this, the old alliances with Great Britain and Austria and the barrier itself had 
already been decaying.
28
 Without the barrier, the Republic was unable to defend herself 
against new French aggression, although France was out of the way as a threat for the 
moment.  
Among all these people, there are also some scholars who believe that the Dutch 
Republic never was a great power to begin with. An example is Peter Rietbergen. He claims 
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that the Republic was never truly able to become a great power, because her own territory and 
population were too small to draw armies from. Still, the Republic is often seen by scholars as 
a great power because regardless of the above, she was too powerful to be completely ignored 
by other countries either, especially when it came to matters at sea. Rietbergen also concedes 
that she was of great economic significance in Europe. However, the Republic also was 
constantly meandering in her politics, stuck between England and France, and was therefore 
incapable of fully deciding her own political course. This was complicated further by the way 
the Republic was governed, which required a lot of discussions and concessions, slowing 
down decision-making. The fact that economic matters played a big role in Dutch politics 
wasn‟t helpful either. Therefore the Republic was unable to be completely independent and to 
create her own path forward, which according to Rietbergen should be a prerequisite for being 
called a great power. 
29
 
Helmut Gabel is also opposed to the idea of the Republic ever having been a great 
power. He acknowledges that the Republic was a powerful force to be reckoned with until the 
eighteenth century, but that even before that the Republic had crucial weaknesses. An 
example of this is the Republic always following England in her political course in the late 
seventeenth century. Gabel brings in some contemporary writers that did not consider the 
Republic a great power, for the reason that she alone wasn‟t able to fight in a war to defend 
her interests, and that her politics were too much focused on peace. Another problem was 
again the decentralized political system, which made it very difficult to create a consistent 
foreign policy between the regents and the stadtholder at the time, William III. Thus, Gabel 
argues that if a country cannot decide its own foreign policy, then that country can‟t be seen 
as a great power.
30
 
These scholars and their research are examples of the much broader debate with many 
more opinions. Niek van Sas calls the Republic powerful until the turn of the eighteenth 
century, after which any power the Republic was thought to have was merely a façade.
31
  
Johan Aalbers considers the decay to have started in 1713, but the Republic remained a 
relevant force in Europe in his eyes until roughly the 1740s by influencing French and English 
politics.
32
 Just about every single book or article writing about the Republic inevitably starts 
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speaking of decay in an economic, political, naval or military sense after the Spanish war of 
Succession. We can continue almost indefinitely with mentioning arguments, but the 
arguments we‟ve seen so far seem to cover most of what the modern debate consists of. We 
have very clearly seen what modern academics consider to be key elements of power: size and 
usage of military, a strong economy, the land area of the state and the size of the population to 
recruit soldiers that are sure to have the best interests of the state in mind (as opposed to 
mercenaries) and the ability to follow an independent foreign policy. Very obvious is that 
most of these are highly objectivist arguments. After all, the size of the military, economic 
profits, land area and population size can be put in numbers and compared to other states. The 
only exceptions we‟ve seen so far are the considerations about the Republic being able to 
follow her own political course and her ability to influence other states. Of course the 
mentioned elements are important to power, but by the end of this paper one will be able to 
see the gap in our knowledge about social-constructivist elements of power, which certainly 
mattered as well, as will be shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These observations about the debate of the Dutch Republic as a great power agree with 
broader discussions about power and great powers that exist in the academic world. Matthew 
Anderson argues that back in eighteenth-century Europe, especially the physical size of the 
state and the population count were highly important in how powerful a state was judged to 
Figure 2: An excerpt of a table taken from a Dutch treatise from 1791. This table compares various 
qualities of France, Great Britain, the Dutch Republic and Austria. From left to right: Land area in 
square miles, population count, national income, size of the army and of the navy. Seeing this 
comparison of these objectivist criteria, it is no surprise that some don‟t see the Republic as a great 
power during this time. Note that this table is still more or less representative of the situation 50 
years earlier, according to contemporary treatises at least. 
Source: De staatkundige balans van Europa (Amsterdam 1791) 1. Short Title Catalogue 
Netherlands (STCN). Record number: ppn 183924754. 
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be. After all, that meant that armies could be conscripted and fed.
33
 Jeremy Black agrees with 
this, but explains that quality mattered as well beside quantity. Governments needed to be 
able to mobilize their resources, to make crucial changes to military and government. Only 
then could a state properly respond to changes in the world around it and continue to play an 
important role.
34
 These same arguments are also often used to discuss whether or not the 
Republic was a great power at any given point. We saw Rietbergen arguing for a large state 
and population as a necessity, for example. Instead of extensively re-analyzing the literature 
we just discussed for the concept of „great power‟ however, a quote from Simon Groenveld 
will be used instead, as it encompasses most of the arguments we see in the debate: 
 
„[The notion of great power] indicates sovereign states, which are quantitatively and 
qualitatively able to determine and follow their own foreign policy that other states are 
required to take in regard, and are able to fight a war relying on their own power. The size of 
the state plays a significant role, as does the population count and economic power, if only 
for the resulting profits that could be mobilized for support political and military power’. 35 
 
So, modern opinions about the core elements of power are often objectivist in nature, 
and the same goes for the debate about great power status, with the additional requirements 
that a country can be independent of other states thanks to these objectivist elements and good 
governance. We can already ask ourselves however if such definitions suffice. The one cited 
above implies that power comes from within a state only. But does power not actually exist 
relative to others? Certainly, a role must also be played by those others then, perhaps through 
attribution of power not necessarily based on objectivist elements. Can a state be a great 
power because other states consider it to be one? The definition above wouldn‟t allow us to 
say so, but as we will see when we get to the contemporary debate,  definitions like the one 
quoted above run into severe difficulties, and it will be shown that the attribution of power 
was very important in considerations about the Dutch Republic as a great power.  
 Finally, it is time to shortly consider the balance of power. As said before, the term 
was and is hardly well defined. William Doyle calls it „A nebulous concept‟.36 Matthew S. 
Anderson states that „The balance of power was still, as it was always to remain, a cloudy and 
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indefinite concept‟. 37 This is highly interesting to see. The concept of the balance of power 
was central to the political debate of the eighteenth century, yet nobody truly knew what it 
encompassed. Even today, definitions are lacking. A few decades ago Martin Wight made an 
attempt to describe the balance of power using fifteen statements he created from observations 
about it in contemporary sources. The core of these fifteen statements is listed below: 
 
 No single state should ever become strong enough to dominate the rest. Any 
aggressors must be dealt with by the overwhelming force of the rest of the whole 
system. 
 The balance is not made on a basis of equality; power distribution is approximate. 
 The balance is not rigid, alliances and the makeup of it can shift. 
 The distribution of power in the balance is the basis of international order and 
freedom. 
 Members have a duty to co-operate to avert dangers to the balance; the balance is a 
peace settlement and a form of international law.
38
 
 
Wight certainly has made a good attempt at capturing the concept, and what we later see 
in the sources seems to fit quite well within this outline. Yet, the many properties the concept 
seems to have illustrates the problem of defining the balance of power. Therefore, one must 
not think too narrowly when discussing the balance of power. This also explains the big 
diversity within the sources: many different topics are related to the balance of power in some 
way because it was such a vaguely defined concept. This is also why sources aren‟t always 
directly written about the balance of power, but rather about things relating to it, such as 
alliances, threats to international freedoms such as trade, the conduct of governments or state 
interests, to name a few examples. 
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As has been plentifully mentioned now, the contemporary debate holds much more 
than the mainly objectivist reasoning we have seen above. Before we dive into all of our 
sources, perhaps it is a good idea to illustrate and introduce the differences in thought by 
using an example. 
  A good place to start might be the Institutions politiques By Jacob von Bielfeld, a 
Prussian baron writing about the political systems of Europe in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. In his second book from 1760, the European political system, power in 
general, the balance of power and separate states are considered. When Bielfeld talks about 
power we can make a comparison to the modern debate. To quote a definition he gives for 
power: 
Figure 3: A literal, visual representation of a balance of power. In this case it concerns Great Britain 
fighting the Spanish, French and the Dutch during America‟s struggle for independence, but this image 
quite simply captures the contemporary concept: state power existed as balance, and coalitions would 
always attempt to keep the balance even against a stronger state. 
Source: American Antiquarian Society, European Political prints 1781-84, Folder 1, BM Number BM-
5827.              
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[the word power encompasses]... toutes les qualities & proprieties d’un Etat, don’t la reunion 
fait naitre les forces & les ressources qui lui sont nècessaires pour se faire respecter des 
autres Peoples de la Terre, se defender contre leurs attaques, & faire valoir, dans le besoin, 
les droits & les pretentions qui’il peut avoir à leur charge’39 
 
It seems that Bielfeld agrees mostly with the modern debate: as elements for a 
powerful state he mentions a state being able to gather the resources and strength to defend 
itself, to make itself respected and to assert its rights and goals, things that could probably 
best be achieved by military force. But later on he makes an interesting statement: he claims 
that it is easy to believe that a state‟s power is directly dependent on the land area the state 
possesses, something we also see in the modern debate. This however, is not necessarily true 
according to Bielfeld. Often, large states have large empty territories that do not add to a 
state‟s power, but still need to be defended. Bigger states have more neighbors that can attack 
from more directions. He goes on to mention that a large population isn‟t a guarantee of 
power either: quality matters over quantity in his opinion, because the past has proven several 
times that smaller states can defeat much bigger ones. „Real‟ power comes from more than 
just a good geographical position, the amount of inhabitants and the state‟s economy.40  
 Bielfeld then makes a further interesting statement on power. Power involves a 
decently sized territory (but not too empty as mentioned above), decently populated to supply 
the army, requires a favorable position preferably with access to the sea, needs rich trade and 
industries, good contacts with other great powers to participate in important international 
affairs, needs patriotism of a sort, the ability to sustain a war over longer periods and time, 
and finally requires a government that governs based on wisdom and not on ignorance, 
superstition and greed.
41
  Here we see many objectivist arguments return, but also a few new 
arguments we can call social-constructivist in nature: the geographical position of the country, 
political structure, good governance, international contacts and an army that wishes to serve 
the fatherland.  Further on another very relevant point is made, namely that the power of a 
state is also, in part, based on the opinion of other states. If a certain state is taken in high 
regard, perhaps because of past prestige that has gained the state a lot of respect, that state can 
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be an important power without actually meeting the objectivist requirements for this.
42
 
Bielfeld mentions the Papal State as an example, but something like this also applies to the 
Dutch Republic, as will be discussed later. 
 In this case, Bielfeld serves to illustrate some things we can find in the discussions 
about the balance of power. The objectivist arguments we saw in the modern debate also 
apply to past thought, but as expected, there is more than just that, as we will first see in our 
next chapter about Dutch pessimism about their own power. 
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Chapter 2: ‘The Truth is, we have a very bad game to play...’ 43 
Dutch pessimism about Dutch power. 
 
When analyzing contemporary opinions about the power of the Dutch Republic, a 
clear, almost perfect split is observed within these contemporary opinions. On one hand, 
Dutch writers and thinkers are pessimistic about Dutch power in various aspects, especially in 
the later eighteenth century. They don‟t attribute the Republic a large role in European affairs, 
they claim that the Republic has little interest in engaging in those affairs unless their own 
business is at stake and they often see themselves as not being powerful in any way in the first 
place. On the other hand, sources from other European countries are much more positive 
about Dutch power, as we will see in the next chapter.   
This chapter will focus on the Dutch pessimism, and we will discuss the several 
reasons why the Dutch didn‟t view the Republic as a great power during most of the first half 
of the eighteenth century. Why were the Dutch so pessimistic about the power and capabilities 
of the Republic? What arguments were put forward to show that the Dutch Republic wasn‟t a 
player, but merely a pawn on the European chessboard? As mentioned before, modern 
scholars are already aware of this pessimism. The reasons often mentioned in this light 
involve economic issues after the Spanish War of Succession and a desire to focus on a 
profitable trade rather than warfare, which was of course detrimental to trade.
 
We know that 
there is truth in these kinds of arguments, but did the contemporary Dutch understand this as 
well, or were there other reasons for their pessimism? 
  It turns out that the pessimism was well-argued for by contemporary Dutch writers. 
Several reasons to be pessimistic about Dutch power can be uncovered from analyzing our 
sources, each of which will be separately discussed, in decreasing order of prominence in the 
sources. The first and foremost mentioned reasons about the Dutch Republic not being a great 
power are objectivist in nature. The status and size of the military and economy were 
considered to be instrumental to power, and it is acknowledged that the Republic had 
problems with both of these. Secondly, it also shows that, in part because of these problems, 
the Dutch were reluctant to attempt to play the role of a great power in the first place, rather 
trying to stay of conflict and nourishing their trade. Thirdly, and interestingly when compared 
to later chapters, the Dutch see themselves as weak because they feel like they are highly 
dependent on their main allies, Austria and Great-Britain. They were required to help keep the 
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Republic‟s barrier in the Southern Netherlands intact in the face of French expansionism. This 
dependence also led to treaties that forced the Republic out of her neutrality, which was also 
viewed as negative. This brings us to a fourth reason we frequently see, namely that the allies 
took advantage of the Republic. She was forced into alliances because of the French threat, 
but her own needs were supposedly ignored by the allies because the Republic had no choice 
but to follow their demands, whatever they were. To finalize, some more general observations 
from the sources that bring us the feeling of pessimism will be discussed. 
As mentioned, the seemingly most important reason why the Dutch didn‟t view the 
Republic as very powerful is objectivist in nature, and matches what we know from our 
modern debate: the Dutch Republic simply wasn‟t able to participate in European affairs on a 
level that the European great powers could because the Republic was unable to maintain a 
qualitatively and quantitatively comparable land army or navy, in part thanks to the poor state 
of the economy. For instance, in a published letter from a member of the Estates-General to a 
member of the British Parliament in 1744, the writer explains to the Brit why the Republic 
isn‟t so eager to participate in the Austrian War of Succession. To begin, he states that: 
 
 „You know that we are not recover’d from the Expences brought upon us by the last general 
War [Spanish War of Succession], and therefore need not be surpriz’d that we are not over 
fond of entering upon a new one?’ 44  
 
A little further on it is said that the French army has shown itself to be vastly superior to the 
Republic‟s forces, which makes the Republic want to stay neutral, out of fear of a French 
invasion.
45
 Interestingly, this writer is pessimistic, but assumes the British recipient to be 
pessimistic as well by saying: 
 
 ‘How low an Opinion soever you may have of the Dutch, I hope you will allow, that they 
ought not to be made Beasts of Burthen...’. 46 
 
Thus we see that this writer doesn‟t deem the Republic powerful enough to play a 
large role in European politics, because the Republic has monetary issues, an army lacking in 
quality and quantity, and a much more formidable enemy that poses a risk, should the 
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Republic decide come out of her neutrality. Because of this, the writer asks for the Dutch to 
be excused for remaining neutral to avoid exacerbation of their already glaring problems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a treatise from a somewhat later time, 1759, discussing Prussia‟s rise to power, we 
see similar sentiments when both France and Prussia are considered to be dangerous to the 
Republic, because of the reduction of her standing armies, navies and a general apathy to war. 
The writer warns that the Republic now risks becoming a simple pawn in the game of Europe, 
something the modern academic debate often considers true for this time period.
47
 A 
published exchange of polemic letters between two Dutch politicians from 1740 also shows 
this process already happening then, when we find complaints in their communication about 
how the Republic is unable to maintain good relations with other powers because of her 
neutrality, and has been incapable of following up on her political promises to her allies. The 
expansion of the Dutch army in response to the outbreak of the Austrian war of Succession is 
noted here, but is also written off as still being insignificant when it‟s considered relative to 
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Considering the fact that the Republic only had about two to two-and-a-half million 
inhabitants around this time, it is not surprising that the relatively large manpower and 
monetary contributions exhausted the Republic‟s resources. 
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the might of other European powers.
48
 One of the writers even apathetically states that maybe 
the government shouldn‟t have bothered, given the fact that such a small augmentation didn‟t 
add anything to the real strength of the army and was wasted effort better spent on other 
affairs.
49
 
Besides the (to the Dutch) obvious incapability of taking on an important role in 
European politics, there is also a clear reluctance to do so, even if it were possible. Trade is 
often used as an argument why the Republic couldn‟t and shouldn‟t participate in any 
conflicts after the Spanish War of Succession. In a series of books containing several 
published letters from a Dutchman to a friend, we see his awareness that trade was what once 
made the Dutch Republic strong. War, he then argues, is a way to disrupt the trade, and as a 
consequence also Dutch power. Therefore, intervening in European conflicts such as the 
Austrian War of Succession is undesirable.
50
  
 However, this same person also states that the Republic staying out of war wasn‟t 
always a good thing. The same letter discussed above reveals the opinion that the anti-war 
mentality is strange: the writer sees the neutrality as malicious, and that his fellow 
countrymen are sacrificing their lives and luxuries by allowing France to grow stronger, 
instead of intervening like their ancestors did.
51
 Likewise, in a treatise discussing European 
interests, the writer also acknowledges the Dutch weakness, but states that by remaining 
neutral the Republic is alienating herself from her former allies. War is bad, but on the long 
term neutrality will also be detrimental. The Republic depends on Great Britain and Austria to 
survive and vice versa, thus she should participate in the wars they are fighting to secure the 
alliance and guarantee their and her own continued existence.
52
 From these last two authors 
we really get the impression that the Republic was stuck between two evils. Whatever she 
picked, it would lead to more trouble in one way or another.  
 Another argument in Dutch pessimism is a general feeling of dependence on other 
powers. The Dutch were terrified that the French would get their hands on their barrier in the 
Southern Netherlands. In the same treatise we just discussed the writer states that the barrier is 
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the most important security measure the Republic has, but it strongly depends on other great 
powers to defend it for the Republic. These other powers must be allied to or at least look 
favorably upon the Republic, otherwise the Republic is in great danger of being overwhelmed 
by France.
53
 In a way the barrier gets a negative connotation here, as it requires alliances, 
while the Republic would rather stay neutral. This is in contradiction to the European view of 
the barrier we will discuss later. One earlier discussed writer even states that the barrier is a 
bad thing. The author speaks about how in practice, the barrier doesn‟t work as it is constantly 
overrun by France. At the same time however, the barrier treaties do force the Republic to 
participate in conflicts she doesn‟t want to participate in. Again, as a result of dependence on 
others, the Republic suffers.
54
 
It has also turned out that dependence might not have just been on the allies, but on 
France as well in this time. We‟ve seen in the academic debate above that France was very 
important in Dutch trade, so conflict with France was to be avoided. In a response to a letter 
from the French ambassador in 1742, the writer, possibly the Estates-General or a member 
thereof, explicitly states that the Republic wants peace with France because it keeps her trade, 
her means of existence, secure. In this letter the Republic even measly pleas the French king 
to permit her to „Conserve precious alliances and confederations‟ with her former allies to 
protect her own borders.
55
 Thus we see here the acknowledgement that Dutch trade still 
depends on France. In this source, it almost sounds as if the Republic sees herself as a vassal 
of France. While this isn‟t the case of course, appeasing language like this does show how the 
Dutch felt about their own chances if it came to a war with France, with or without the allies. 
 Another reason why the Dutch felt pessimistic about their power should perhaps not 
be sought in the Republic herself, but rather in her allies, Great Britain and Austria. These 
were frequently allied to each other and the Republic between the late seventeenth to the mid-
eighteenth century. What can sometimes be found in Dutch sources is a sense of betrayal by 
these other powers. The earlier cited writer to a British member of Parliament states that the 
Republic follows up on her promises made in treaties and agreements during the Austrian war 
of Succession, but only does so reluctantly because, for her support to the war, she gets 
nothing in return from the allies. The writer asks the recipient whether it is so strange then 
that the Republic is careful in what she does and that they shouldn‟t be surprised that pushing 
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the Republic too much will only make her less eager to exert herself for the cause of others.
56
 
In a previously discussed letter it is claimed that the Republic refuses to fight alongside her 
allies, because she is afraid that these allies will impose laws and treaties on her that are 
against her own interests.
57
 Further elaboration in that letter has the writer claiming that the 
Republic has been consistently used by England and Austria without reward, and that it is not 
certain whether these allies would do the same for the Republic if the need were to arise.
58
 
Meanwhile, participating in the war of the Austrian Succession is perilous to the Republic, 
claims the same writer in a different letter, and getting engaged further in the war is a sure 
way to cause even more detriment to the Republic.
59
 In a longer French version of the letter 
this chapter started off with, it is also shown that Austria doesn‟t defend the Southern 
Netherlands properly, because Austria knows that Great Britain and The Republic will take 
over that responsibility, because they have no other choice. Austria has thus seen fit to 
abandon the Republic here.
60
 The Republic doesn‟t want things to be like this, but has no 
choice, and in effect is always the loser: either do as her allies say and become victim of their 
will, or be enslaved by the enemy.
61
 
 Because of things like this, it shouldn‟t be surprising that the sources also show that 
the Dutch are not just passively unable but also actively unwilling to try and play the role of a 
great power, instead rather concentrating on securing themselves and their own good. 
Sometimes it is acknowledged that the Republic joining in or staying out of a war is good or 
bad for the balance of power, but when this is spoken of the reader also gets the idea that 
whatever role the Republic will play in the balance, it isn‟t a crucial role. A passive role in the 
balance of power is sometimes attributed as well. For example, one writer states that if France 
occupied the Republic, it would eventually lead to maritime supremacy over the British and a 
possible conquest of Great Britain following after that, fatally altering the balance of power.
62
 
 The most important arguments given for Dutch pessimism have been mentioned 
above, but just from reading the texts and the tone they are written in one also gets the feeling 
the Republic isn‟t considered to be powerful. She is hardly ever mentioned as ever having 
been a great power. The few times where it is at least somewhat implied all argue for a 
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powerful Republic only before the Treaty of Utrecht.
63
 Consequentially, most of the sources 
originating from the Republic mainly discuss the wants and desires of the Republic above all 
else. Compared to the other European sources, there is relatively little attention to broader 
European matters, also showing us a kind of timidity the Dutch seemed to have about trying 
to be part of this bigger system, again showing their reluctance and self-perceived incapability 
of participating. 
 Because of these things it has become very clear that the Dutch were highly 
pessimistic about the power of the Dutch Republic. As we‟ve seen, the Dutch saw their armies 
and navies as weak and had considerable economic issues, in part caused by the many 
previously fought wars. This rendered them incapable of playing an important role in larger 
European affairs, but even if they could they were reluctant to, rather focusing on keeping the 
peace to safeguard their trade. Besides this they seemed to think of their allies as bad allies, 
being perhaps only a lesser evil when compared to France instead of being good, reliable 
allies. This was because in the eyes of the Republic, her needs had frequently been ignored 
and her dealings with the allies forced her into actions she didn‟t want to commit, such as 
breaking her neutrality and getting involved in more conflicts. With these kinds of perceptions 
it is no wonder that the Dutch didn‟t consider themselves a great power, or even a 
considerable power during the first half of the eighteenth century, which explains the general 
apathy and negativity we see in our sources. Interestingly, we see a lot of objectivist 
arguments: the size and quality of army and navy and economic arguments dominate the 
negativity, although we also do see some social-constructivist argumentation such as the 
„curse‟ of the barrier, which forced the Republic into malignant alliances and costly wars. 
This chapter thus confirms that much argumentation for a loss of great power status by the 
early eighteenth century from the modern debate was shared by the contemporary Dutch. We 
can ask ourselves if perhaps modern authors have focused too much on Dutch sources when 
trying to determine her status as a great power. The European sources, then, might have been 
overlooked, given the fact that the Dutch pessimism about their power was not shared by 
contemporary Europeans, especially the British. We will see this in the coming chapter.  
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Chapter 3: ‘Holland and Zealand are so strong by Nature, that 
they are capable of defending themselves against the whole 
world...’ 64 
European optimism about Dutch power. 
 
Having analyzed the Dutch contemporary perspective on their great power status, and seeing 
the negative answer, it is now time to turn to the broader European debate. How did people 
living in other European states think about the power of the Dutch Republic? As mentioned, it 
turns out that the negativity seen quite early in Dutch sources finds no matching pessimism in 
the European sources. Almost uniformly, the European sources are much more optimistic 
about the capabilities and power of the Republic throughout the first half of the eighteenth 
century. While the Dutch Republic sees herself as a power struggling to continue her 
existence and clinging to neutrality in the hopes of surviving, the rest of Europe still sees her 
as formidable in various ways until as late as the 1750s. Considering what we know about the 
modern debate and the contemporary Dutch opinion, this is very surprising. Why couldn‟t the 
other European states see the weaknesses of the Republic and her incapability of keeping up 
with the rest of the European powers? This chapter will focus on analyzing the reasons why 
the Dutch Republic was still seen as an important power by other powers in Europe until 
roughly the end of the Austrian War of Succession (1740-1748).  
If we shortly reconsider the debate outlined in the first chapter, it has to be clear that 
this perception of a powerful Dutch Republic couldn‟t have been based on objectivist 
reasoning. Indeed, as we study the contemporary European opinion, we see completely 
different arguments about what makes the Dutch Republic so powerful, many of them social-
constructivist in nature. Again, several arguments are most prominent and these will be 
discussed in order of decreasing prominence.  
A first argument is related to the past and prestige. It seems that contemporary thinkers 
and writers thought of prestige as an important element of power. Thus, the Republic‟s past 
achievements and the role she played in the balance of power and the Grand Alliance 
mattered a lot in the European perception of her power. Therefore, they judged the Republic 
to be much stronger than the Dutch themselves did. A second important reason the Europeans 
seemed to have for viewing the Republic as a great power is related to her governmental 
structure and how the country was ruled. Possibly because of the Enlightenment did the 
Europeans think of the Republican government and her careful maneuvering on the European 
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playing field as wise government, something to be commended and signifying of a wise, 
powerful state. Some even state that her course of government should be followed by others, 
attributing the Republic a leadership role in politics. The third important element we find is 
the Dutch barrier in the Southern Netherlands. As we will see, the barrier was thought of as a 
crucial part of the balance of power, important for all of Europe. The trust put in the Dutch to 
defend the barrier and her own stake in defending it bring us the belief that other Europeans 
thought of her as strong enough to play such an important role. These arguments are 
important, but also a general feeling one gets from reading the sources will be discussed, as 
that too speaks of the European optimism about Dutch power. Finalizing this chapter will be a 
short comparison between this European optimism and the previously discussed Dutch 
pessimism, as an interesting difference in perspectives on some arguments can be found. 
 Perhaps it is a good place to start where we ourselves are right now: studying history 
to find out how we got to where we are today. Those who wrote treatises and essays on the 
balance of power and European politics were no stranger to this. Plenty of these writings have 
historical considerations in them, often about the balance of power itself, or how various 
powers have risen to matter or fallen to lose significance in this balance. As it turns out, 
historical perspective on a certain power very much mattered in how powerful a state was 
perceived to be.  As a German writer discussing the plans of the anti-French alliance during 
the Austrian War of Succession says: 
 
„A State should be no less cautious of risking its Honour and Reputation, than the Merchant 
his credit; for how rich soever the Adventurer, he is soon unhinged if he loses his Credit; and 
however powerful soever the State, it loses half its Weight and Influence, if it loses its 
Reputation, or forfeits its Honour.‟65 
 
To this writer, prestige and honor clearly matter in how a state is perceived by others. 
It seems that this particular writer was not alone in this mentality; we already saw Bielfeld 
saying the same, and M.S. Anderson also found evidence of such thoughts, as seen in the 
introduction to this paper. Several times more in other sources studied for this paper there are 
also references to the Dutch Republic‟s past, and prestige is given to the Republic based on 
that past, sometimes arguing that the Republic is in later times still as mighty as she was in 
her heyday. 
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 Several examples of this prestige can be found. Let us momentarily return to Jacob 
von Bielfeld. When he is writing his third book in the early 1770s, he does consider the 
Republic to be quite weak already, as we will see when he returns in a later chapter discussing 
the Dutch decay of power in European eyes. However, he remains somewhat optimistic, 
saying that the Dutch navy still has quite a bit of potential to become powerful once again. He 
bases this opinion on the fact that the Republic was in her recent past a state that always paid 
much attention to her navy. Bielfeld speaks of a former Dutch genius, and that no country in 
Europe was in that sense comparable to her at sea. Seventeenth-century Admirals Tromp and 
De Ruyter are mentioned as models for good navy management, and it is also stated that the 
British navy would have never stood a chance against the French in earlier wars, had the 
Republic not been there to give support.
66
 Thus, although Bielfeld speaks mostly about the 
past here, he is convinced that the Republic, even as late as 1774, is perhaps able to become 
mighty and formidable at sea again, and is solely hindered by poor government.
67
 Here we 
quite clearly see the point described above: because the Republic was at some point very 
mighty at sea, Bielfeld thinks that she is still quite capable of being so, if only the government 
tried harder. Nowadays we know that this wasn‟t true, and that the Republic‟s navy was in an 
abysmal condition, as would soon show in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, but this case neatly 
illustrates the power of prestige. 
 Bielfeld is a late example of this, but we also have some writers from a time period 
somewhat more fit to our discussion. In a treatise concerning the German territories in the 
Austrian War of Succession from 1741, the writer states that if the Duke of Marlborough, a 
very important British general during the Spanish war of Succession and Anthony Heinsius, 
Grand Pensionary of Holland 1689-1720, were to rise from their graves, „they would blush for 
the bungling Conduct of their Countrymen‟68. This implies that, during the time period the 
author writes about, none of the allied powers were trying hard enough to stop France‟s 
growing power, but that they were certainly capable of doing so if only they put more effort 
into it. That in turn implies that nothing much has changed in the countries responsible for the 
balance of power, and brings us the idea that this writer thinks the Republic is still capable of 
playing the same role in the balance of power as she did during the Spanish war of 
Succession. Another example of prestige attributing power to the Republic is from 1749. In 
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this treatise the peace treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle (1748) is discussed. The writer praises how 
the Dutch provinces of Holland and Zealand brought the Republic into the Austrian War of 
Succession, and claims that they were able to do so because: 
 
„Holland and Zealand are so strong by Nature, that they are capable of defending themselves 
against the whole World...‟69 
 
The writer then explains why he feels that this is the case. He does so by referring to the Year 
of Disaster (1672). Louis XIV had almost overrun the Republic, but the spirit of the Dutch 
people was strong and decisive, which allowed them to decide to breach the dykes and save 
the Republic from demise.
70
 This accomplishment apparently impressed the writer so much 
that he believed it could happen again. Once more, we see the idea that not much has changed 
since past times, and thus even as late as 1749 we see someone who is under the impression 
that the Republic can be an extremely powerful state if she desires to be so, thanks to the 
prestige she gained from surviving the Year of Disaster. These examples clearly demonstrate 
that the quote at the beginning of this chapter could be representative for some contemporary 
political thought: that prestige from even a long-gone past could still greatly matter in 
perceptions of power in later times. 
 Her own prestige wasn‟t the only thing from the past that made the Republic seem 
more powerful than the Dutch themselves thought. Something else that seems to have made 
the Republic more powerful in European eyes is tradition, namely in the form of alliances. 
The „Old System‟ of the Grand Alliance, an alliance mainly consisting of England (later Great 
Britain), the Dutch Republic and Austria was the core of resistance against the expansion of 
French Influence in Europe, from the late 17
th
 century until 1756. Of course the Republic 
highly valued her allies, especially in later times, to keep her safe, but it seems that the other 
allies (most notably Great Britain) also desired that this Old System remained intact. In plenty 
of treatises writers seem convinced that the participation of the Dutch Republic in the alliance 
is crucial for a victory, as this alliance had had many victories in the past. An example of this 
is a treatise offering a solution to keep the balance of power safe, where it is argued that Great 
Britain should help out Austria in her conflict with France because if Great Britain, the 
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Republic and Austria unite, it will mean victory over France.
71
 Later on the wording becomes 
a bit stronger and more clearly supportive of a powerful Dutch Republic: 
 
„And whatever Hopes England may flatter herself with, of supporting herself singly, when the 
rest of the world is subdued; I will venture to prophesy, that her Fate will be the same with 
the rest in a few Years, if not a few Months. For at the bottom, we and the Dutch are the Mark 
the French aim at.‟72 
 
The writer is thus saying that Great Britain can‟t fight her wars alone. Together with the 
Dutch they stand strong, and France attacking Austria is just an attempt to undermine that 
strength.
73
 A treatise examining the conduct of the allies from 1747 even states that Great 
Britain follows the Republic in many things she does, and that following the Republic in her 
preparedness against France to resist her attempts at „ill purposes‟ is advisable.74 This even 
attributes a leadership role to the Dutch Republic in her mentality towards war. Being able to 
set examples and having powerful states follow the Republic in their political decisions makes 
the Republic seem quite powerful. More of Dutch attitudes towards war and peace will be 
discussed later on in this chapter. 
 In an earlier discussed treatise about the German territories we also see the desire that 
the Grand Alliance should be revived during the Austrian War of Succession in order to keep 
the peace in Europe, as settled by the Treaty of Utrecht.
75
 The writer resents the fact that 
instead of this old alliance, a completely different, complex web of treaties and alliances has 
been formed to fight in the Austrian War of Succession. Great Britain isn‟t doing a good job 
at keeping the balance in Europe and thus the Old System must be restored in order to keep 
the balance safe. 
76
 We see here that the Old System and Britain‟s previous allies carry a lot of 
weight in the eyes of the contemporary writers, preferring this Old System that had always 
worked so well over a newer system, which they write off as unsuccessful. This also can be 
seen as a form of prestige, and the writer essentially asks: why change a winning team? 
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 Strongly related to the prestige of the Old System is also the idea that there is some 
form of co-dependence between the Dutch and the British, which could have evolved from the 
many decades of close co-operation. Of course we see this a lot in the British sources. A 
treatise complaining about the newly established Ostend East-India Company written in 1726 
emphasizes how strongly Great Britain and the Republic are connected. According to this 
writer, they together maintain the entire European balance of power, and because their 
security and trade are connected to each other, one cannot survive or maintain the balance of 
power without the other. The writer also states that if the Republic would disappear, no other 
would be strong enough to take over her prominent position.
77
  
This also explains a constant feature across many sources, namely that the Dutch 
Republic and Great Britain are very often mentioned together when wars and the balance of 
power are discussed, again with both as important keepers of the balance of power. An earlier 
mentioned general treatise considering the whole of the European balance of power defends 
the British crown for not declaring war on France as of 1743 and for not assisting the emperor 
of the Holy Roman Empire in an earlier war, presumably the Polish War of Succession (1733-
1735). Why did this happen? The writer mentions two reasons, one of which is very relevant 
to us: 
 
„The Dutch (without whom we ought to never engage in a Land-War) had signed a Neutrality 
with France...‟ 78 
 
What is obvious here is that Great Britain was afraid to get into any conflict on the continent 
without getting the Dutch involved, and that in two instances, because of the Republic‟s 
neutrality, Great Britain remained neutral (so far) in important European conflicts. This means 
that Great Britain, by most modern academics seen as much more powerful than the Republic 
at this time, maybe already a great power, seems to be quite heavily depending on the Dutch 
Republic to be able to exercise that power in Europe, at least on the continent. 
Consequentially, this makes the Dutch Republic seem quite powerful as well, being a 
necessary ingredient for the British to be successful in manifesting her power. The Republic, 
then, is able to have a great influence on the balance of power in Europe, by choosing to or 
                                                          
77
 Verhandelinge, Daarin ontdekt worden: I. De Rampzaalige gevolgen, die de Engelsche en Hollanders van de 
oprechtinge der Compagnie van Oostende te vreesen hebben. (Amsterdam 1726) 2-19. 
78
 The present measures proved to be the only means of securing the Balance of power in Europe, 23. 
35 
 
choosing not to participate in any given conflict. A powerful state depending on a different 
state grants that latter state quite a position of power in the eyes of others, as we can see here. 
 A treatise from 1735 considering the Polish War of Succession and the British role in 
this conflict has a similar tone. The writer is deeply concerned about the Republic‟s neutrality 
in this conflict. Perhaps the Republic is afraid to rely on her allies because of past diplomatic 
mishaps or changes in political climates.
79
 But, what the author fears much more is the 
following: 
 
‘... but perhaps, more probably, that French Gold has found its way to some of the Chiefs in 
the Administration there; and then, if this should happen to be the Case, adieu to the Liberties 
of Europe.‟80 
 
Shortly before this is said, the writer states that if the Republic and Great Britain do not come 
to Austria‟s aid, it will result in Austria eventually falling victim to French ambitions.81 Thus 
it comes down to the following: Austria requires help, but Great Britain cannot help Austria 
alone. The Republic must join in order to save the balance of power in Europe, but the writer 
is afraid that the Dutch neutrality might be a consequence of corruption of the government by 
France. If that happens to be the case, the writer believes that the liberties of Europe, i.e. the 
balance of power, may as well be said farewell to. The role of the Dutch Republic in alliances 
was thus considered crucial until the middle of the eighteenth century, likely because of 
earlier successes of the Old System. Writers truly seem to have believed that the Old System 
was still viable during the Austrian War of Succession, and some might have even seen it as 
the only alliance that could really work. 
A second theme we frequently see in our sources has to do with government and 
political structure. Many European writers considered the Republic to have a wise 
government that made well-thought out decisions that were in the best interest of the 
Republic. Several times we see writers praising the Dutch government for her „wisdom‟ and 
commendable carefulness. In a treatise discussing the British conduct in relation to the 
balance of power, the writer acknowledges that the Dutch are very slow in political decision-
making and are quite clearly holding back with taking up arms in the Austrian War of 
Succession. But this is no wonder, given the fact that in the past, the Republic hasn‟t always 
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been treated too fairly by the other allies. Their wariness should be applauded, not condemned 
because:  
 
„The first principle in every Government, is that which is the Basis of the Law of Nature, I 
mean Self-Preservation.‟82  
 
A French treatise discussing options for a general European peace written two years 
later also states that the Dutch Republic should be counted among the great powers of Europe, 
in part also because of the wisdom of her government and the jealousy her neighbors have 
because of that.
83
  Especially British writers seem to be understanding of the Republic‟s 
neutrality and self-interest, but are still convinced that if it comes down to it, the Republic will 
be there to fight for her allies and the balance of power, especially if there is something to 
gain.
84
 A writer of a letter to an English periodical in 1734 praises the Dutch wisdom and says 
that Great Britain should do as the Republic does: refusing to exert herself for the balance of 
power because her allies are stupid enough to constantly wage war against states they can‟t 
fight alone.
85
 Again, the Republic is attributed a leading role in war and peace mentality that, 
if it were up to the writer, should be followed for the good of Great Britain. 
 Occasionally we also see a more general remark about the political structure of the 
Dutch Republic. The fact that she is a republic is then mentioned as being the reason why she 
was able to establish such a fruitful trade, and in consequence was able to become powerful.
86
 
The earlier discussed treatise that claimed that the Republic could defend herself against the 
whole world states that her power comes from the republican freedom, and that this freedom 
must be defended at all costs. After all, if that freedom is taken away the Republic would 
„revert to its Original, an uninhabited bog‟.87 So this also gives us the impression that other 
European powers saw her as powerful because of her governmental structure. A French book 
about the Republic and her trade even directly puts her among the great powers with one of 
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the main reasons being her republican government. 
88
 This does make sense, given the fact 
that her trade had made the Republic powerful and that the Republican government was much 
more conducive to trade than most monarchies. Thus, the Republic‟s uncommon form of 
government also allowed her to appear more powerful and capable than she thought herself to 
be. 
A third social-constructivist argument that argues for the Dutch Republic still being an 
important power in Europe until halfway through the century is related to her geographical 
position. For us, there are two key elements here: her coast on the North Sea and her 
associated economic advantages from this, and the barrier in the Spanish/Austrian 
Netherlands. The element of the coastal position for trade is frequently used in a passive 
matter, and will be noted after the element that matters much more to us: the barrier. The 
barrier was very relevant when it is thought of in the context of the balance of power, as it 
required and created active intervention of different states to ensure its survival. Why this 
made the Republic seem powerful will be explained below. 
 An important fact that can be taken from the sources is the fact that the Dutch barrier 
in the Austrian Netherlands wasn‟t just important to the Dutch Republic, but to Europe as a 
whole. The Dutch Barrier officially came into existence with the barrier treaties that were 
created during the War of the Spanish Succession and shortly after the Peace of Utrecht. 
Essentially, these treaties allowed the Republic to garrison a handful of cities in the Austrian 
Netherlands to function as a protective barrier against French invasion.
89
 In the century before 
this, the barrier already existed in a way, with Dutch-controlled parts of Brabant and Flanders 
and the Spanish Netherlands functioning as a buffer zone against France.
90
 Naturally, the 
Republic paid close attention to the security of her barrier since it came into existence, and in 
Dutch writings from this period we often see complaints and fears about the barrier being 
overrun. A powerful neighbor such as France would be incredibly bad news for the Republic, 
which put her at risk for wars on her own territory and having her trade in the Southern 
Netherlands and at sea endangered. But surprisingly, as stated, plenty of writers abroad also 
considered the barrier to be incredibly important, and not just for the conservation of the 
Dutch Republic. Because the Republic had such a large stake in keeping the barrier safe that 
did mean however that, in European eyes, the Republic was an important active participant on 
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the bigger European political playing field whose role could even become crucial when the 
barrier was at risk. 
A treatise from the end of the eighteenth century shows us that during our studied time 
period the barrier was perhaps even a core element of the whole European balance of power. 
According to this writer, the Republic and her barrier were important for British trade and 
naval superiority in the North Sea. At the same time it served as a strong frontier for the Holy 
Roman Empire against France. Putting the control of this barrier in Dutch hands was natural, 
as their direct political but also commercial interests would ensure that it would always 
remain preserved.
91
 Although this treatise is from a much later time than the period we‟re 
discussing, we see similar sentiments in contemporary writings. This shows that the Dutch 
were entrusted with the preservation of a crucial part of the European balance of power, 
which shows that other European powers, in this case her allies, saw her as powerful enough 
to do so. Of course, the barrier treaties also involved the Austrians in the protection of the 
barrier, but with some frequency we see complaints in our sources that the Austrians aren‟t 
doing their part in keeping the barrier safe. More on this will be discussed in a later chapter, 
but the fact that others were aware that Austria wasn‟t doing enough, yet little action was 
taken, brings the thought that the Republic was considered powerful enough to maintain the 
barrier on her own. 
Another treatise from 1743 shows that the Republic is reluctant to engage in the 
Austrian War of Succession, but now that her barrier is at stake, she is considering it. The 
author is very happy about this, but what this most importantly shows is that there is quite a 
desire by the allies to have the Republic participate in the war to preserve the balance. Thus, 
the Republic is again shown as being powerful enough to have a direct effect on larger 
European affairs, and she may be willing to do so because of her interests in the barrier as a 
broader European interest.
92
 In way, then, the barrier was something that could „activate‟ the 
Republic and force her to come out of neutrality to come fight for the allied cause. The allies 
were quite aware of the fact that when the barrier was at stake, the Republic would be much 
more inclined to take up arms in order preserve it.
93
 That in itself doesn‟t seem to grant the 
Republic any power, but if perceptions of power involve taking on an active role in 
international politics then surely the barrier made the Republic seem much more powerful 
than she perhaps was. After all, the danger to her barrier was a big reason why the Republic 
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fiercely fought in the Spanish War of Succession and why she eventually joined into the 
fighting during the Austrian War of Succession. Interestingly, Olaf van Nimwegen also calls 
the barrier the „cement that held the Maritime Powers and Austria together‟, and calls the 
Republic the cornerstone of the Old System through her barrier.
94
 Because the Old System 
gave the Republic power through prestige, the barrier kept the prestige from the Old System 
standing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We thus see that the barrier was given importance in various ways, as being a 
protector of the balance of power and to keep France at bay, but perhaps also to bring the 
Republic into a fight for that balance of power. This also explains why so much fighting 
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any French attacks, to give the Republic time to mobilize and prepare her armies for battle. 
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occurred over the barrier, and why authors complain when the Republic is left to fend for 
herself in the Austrian Netherlands.
95
  
Of course, this claim about the barrier making the Dutch Republic powerful requires 
some nuance. It is important to make a distinction between an active role and a passive role of 
the Republic in maintaining the barrier. As is already well known among historians, the Dutch 
Republic did try her hardest to preserve the barrier as a means of protecting herself from 
France. As shown above, Europe saw the Republic as important to European matters and as a 
powerful state, as the security of the balance of power in Europe was entrusted to her 
protection of the barrier. But we should not forget that the barrier also passively mattered to 
Europe, without the Republic being a player. After all, the Republic, powerful or not, still had 
enormous economic potential. If France were to get her hands on the Dutch territories, the 
balance wouldn‟t be in danger because the Republic was no longer there, but rather because 
France now possessed the Dutch assets: A greatly enriched global trade, the coast with easy 
access to the North Sea to endanger British maritime power, and plenty of colonized overseas 
territories enhancing both of these risks. Therefore it is not surprising that the barrier was 
given such a huge importance. Of course the Republic was still important in various ways, as 
has been and will be further discussed, but this should certainly be kept in the back of the 
mind when speaking about this subject. Likewise, the Austrian Netherlands themselves 
mattered in this way: this too was still a rich region of Europe that needed to be kept out of 
French hands, which was another reason to secure it, not necessarily contributing to a 
perception of a powerful Dutch Republic. 
Next to the themes discussed above, there are plenty of other mentions of the Republic 
being important and powerful in Europe that don‟t too strictly fall in a single category. Just 
generally speaking from the corps of European sources as a whole, in their discussions of the 
politics and wars at the time, writers mention the Republic often enough that the reader gets 
the idea that the Republic was a relevant state within Europe that needed to be included if one 
wanted their discussion and arguments to seem valid. Especially the strength of the 
Republic‟s navy is still considered pretty high until the mid-eighteenth century, frequently 
being called a maritime power, or in conjunction with Great Britain, one of „the‟ maritime 
powers of Europe that are unmatched by France.
96
 One earlier mentioned French treatise does 
exactly this by placing the Republic next to Great Britain on the level of great powers just 
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because the author considers her navy to be so powerful.
97
 The Republic and Great Britain 
are, as said before, also plentifully mentioned together as being important to keep the balance 
of power in Europe, clearly showing that Great Britain and/or Austria alone aren‟t enough.98 
The other European powers are very convinced that the Republic‟s reluctance to partake in 
bigger affairs is simply due to carefulness and the fact that she attempts to secure the needs of 
her people first before doing anything else.
99
 This then isn‟t interpreted as a state trying to 
keep itself safe during a time of military or political weakness, but rather as a state refusing to 
get pushed around by others and deciding over her own matters by instead looking at its own 
interests first before paying attention to other affairs, such as preparing for a conflict with 
France rather than raising troops to fight elsewhere.
100
 When a writer calls for action again 
France, the Republic is often mentioned as a state that needs to help intervene in order to keep 
the balance.
101
 When there is spoken of subsidies and troops, it is said that Dutch subsidies are 
quite large and also very important to the upkeep of troops against France. These subsidies, 
along with British subsidies, were supposedly even larger than the French subsidies to 
troops.
102
 The trade of the Republic and her overseas empire are also regularly mentioned as 
being something that makes her powerful.
103
 After all, trade is what made her powerful to 
begin with and trade was often subject of the wars she fought. 
104
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Perhaps also worth mentioning is the interesting fact that every now and then, the 
Republic is mentioned to be not all that strong. But when this is mentioned, she is usually not 
alone in this. One treatise even dares to call all of the allies weak, all reduced to this weakness 
by France.
105
 Also implied often is that Great Britain and the Republic must help out if 
Austria wants to stand a chance against France, and as said before Great Britain seems to have 
„needed‟ the Republic to be able to be a relevant power herself. What this all means is that 
separately none of these states were particularly strong, but only in combination they could be 
a relevant force. This is not flattering, but it puts the Republic on par with the rest of the allies 
when it comes to considerations about power. Therefore, the power we consider Austria or 
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Great Britain to have, we might also have to attribute to the Republic. Perhaps she was not 
much different from her allies, at least in their eyes. Given the fact that Austria is often 
considered a great power in this time, and Great Britain sometimes as well, this does give us 
an argument to consider the Republic to be a great power as well. 
From this chapter it has become clear that other European powers apparently viewed 
the Republic as being more powerful than she viewed herself, at least until the end of the 
Austrian War of Succession. What is notable and important to the argument this paper 
attempts to make is that the arguments for this view of a powerful Republic are mostly social-
constructivist in nature. Where we see mainly pessimistic objectivist arguments in the 
literature, and also in part in Dutch contemporary opinion, we now see optimism in the social-
constructivist arguments. The Republic‟s prestige from past accomplishments had writers 
abroad considering her to be powerful, and many years later they still saw her as able to 
repeat the actions that gave her that prestige, if necessary. A similar kind of prestige was 
attributed to the „Old System‟ of the Grand Alliance that had fought against French 
expansionism for many decades, often successfully. Because of all these successes, writers 
believed that the Republic was a crucial element in this alliance to help maintain the balance 
of power in Europe in general and to be a check on French power. This is why she was called 
upon to fight along in European wars in the first half of the eighteenth century. The same goes 
for the barrier, which some believed was a barrier for all of Europe, being the linchpin of the 
balance of power that secured everyone from French domination. The Republic was a relevant 
player here because her stake in the barrier was perhaps the largest, protecting her from a 
dangerous neighbor. Even the Republic‟s reluctance to partake in larger European affairs and 
desire for neutrality were viewed as a manifestation of power: rather than weakness, it was 
interpreted as an independent state refusing to be pushed around by others, placing her own 
interests first before those of the rest of Europe, keeping a politically independent course 
when this was best for her to safeguard her trade and to prevent her allies from exploiting her. 
Thus very clearly, the Republic was considered to be a powerful state, just as important to the 
balance of power and the European system as states like Great Britain and Austria were. We 
now perhaps have an argument to „extend‟ the Dutch great power status further into the 
eighteenth century than most of the modern debate agrees upon. But important is also the 
question of where the end of this extension should be placed? This is what we will be dealing 
with in the coming chapter. 
After seeing all these arguments, it is obvious that there is a contradiction to be found 
here. A comparison is in order. Dutch writers were negative about many things, such as the 
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barrier keeping the Republic engaged in European affairs while at the same time hardly 
working to keep the French threat at bay. Her neutrality and hesitating, stagnating government 
were viewed by most Dutch as negative and as being the reason the Republic‟s alliances were 
wilting and that she was being exploited by her allies. Likewise, the old alliances were often 
seen as negative, as a drain on Dutch power, power that would best be maintained by 
independence and freedom to trade instead. These are clearly negative points, but from the 
European perspective these arguments are suddenly positive: the barrier was in their eyes a 
well-cared for element of the balance of power that could cause the Republic to fight and 
successfully maintain the balance of power in Europe. The slow decision-making and 
neutrality of the government was not seen as negative and a sign of weakness, but rather as 
wise government, carefully making decisions to find the best path between her own interests 
and those of others, instead of throwing herself into wars or getting pushed around by allies 
and enemies alike. The alliances some Dutch writers resented were in European eyes an 
important element of Dutch power, as the prestige from these and the influence it granted in 
the balance of power kept her on the European playing field as a relevant force. The Republic 
contributed, but in European eyes also benefitted from the alliances, although 
Clearly there are some clashing opinions here, and this could tell us something about 
differing perceptions of power between the Dutch and other Europeans. The Dutch saw their 
economy as their most important source of power, and the economy was best nourished by 
peace and neutrality because that encouraged trade. Thus, there was no interest in taking part 
in European affairs because that was detrimental to their power. But other European writers 
seemed to think that the participation in European affairs was crucial if a state wished to be 
considered an important power. After all, they were negative about neutrality and positive 
about participation. What does this tell us? The division between objectivism and social-
constructivism this paper is discussing perhaps already existed in a similar way back in the 
eighteenth century! We can see clearly opposing viewpoints: the Dutch Republic considered 
her strong economy and the consequential ability to pay for a large military important to her 
power, while other European writers seemed to deem other things important as well, such as 
that wise government, the barrier or the alliances. These differences also explain why the 
Dutch felt pessimistic, while other Europeans were optimistic. Still, these differences couldn‟t 
prevent the eventual decay of this European optimism, as we will see in the coming chapter. 
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Chapter 4: ‘… for Holland is not any more to us, what she formerly was, 
the faithful friend and ally of Great Britain...’ 106 
Decay of European optimism about Dutch power. 
 
It is quite interesting to see that eighteenth-century European writers discussing the balance of 
power and the politics of Europe viewed the Dutch Republic as powerful for much longer 
than modern day academics do or the contemporary Dutch writers did. But, interesting as that 
is, it is of no help to determining a moment or time of decay of this Dutch power if that 
opinion never changed. Fortunately for us, that change did eventually take place. It seems that 
after the Austrian War of Succession ended, the contemporary European writers were quick to 
realize that the Dutch Republic was not as strong as she once had been and that her role in 
international affairs was quickly diminishing, if not completely finished off yet. This chapter 
will show how the European writers thought of the Dutch Republic after the war of the 
Austrian succession, up until roughly 1780, when everyone was truly able to see her weakness 
as she was humiliated in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war by her former ally that was, as we‟ve 
seen, once dependent on her.  
This decay of Dutch power can be observed from the sources in three ways. The most 
obvious way, of course, is that the writers of treatises and other writings start mentioning the 
Republic‟s problems and weaknesses. They talk about her former glory and how she is now 
irrelevant to bigger European matters. Some glimpses of these complaints are already visible 
before the first half of the century, which will be discussed as well. A second way the decay 
becomes obvious is when writers discuss the breakdown of the social-constructivist elements 
that made her important in European eyes before the middle of the century, such as the 
barrier, her wise government and the Old System. The third and final way the decay of Dutch 
power and relevance becomes obvious is simple silence. Before the middle of the century, the 
Republic was plentifully mentioned and discussed in the context of European politics and the 
balance of power, but after the Austrian War of Succession she starts disappearing from the 
discussion. This implies that the people who discussed these European matters no longer saw 
the Republic as a relevant force that could bring any notable change in the European playing 
field, and was thus no longer a great power in their eyes. 
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 Perhaps it is best to start off a little earlier than that however. It has been discussed that 
before the middle of the century, most authors viewed the Republic as still powerful and 
relevant. However, as overwhelmingly positive they were about the Republic, they were not 
universally so. Although few in number, already before the middle of the century we 
occasionally see some doubts concerning the Republic and her ability to be as powerful as 
most of Europe sees her. An earlier discussed treatise in which we found much positivity 
about Dutch power also does state that she was sluggish to come into action in the Austrian 
War of Succession, and could have prevented a lot worse by intervening sooner. The writer 
seems forgiving however, acknowledging that the Republic also needs to look after herself, 
rather than putting the rest of Europe first.
107
 The treatise discussing the German states argues 
that compulsive neutrality in general is a bad thing. Given the fact that the Republic was 
indeed compulsively trying to stay neutral to defend herself this in effect is also a negative 
remark.
108
 The treatise that discussed allied conduct also argues that yes, the Dutch Republic 
will always follow up on her word. But in what way? The author discusses some Dutch 
contributions to the war effort of the Austrian War of Succession and states that the Dutch 
troops are of low quality, causing the army to falter. He also suspects that the Dutch generals 
secretly have orders to try not to aggravate France against the Dutch. Because of these 
problems, he doubts that the Dutch are truly willing to wage war as intensely as the other 
allies do, likely out of fear for France.
109
 A British letter discussing the general state of 
European affairs notes troubles with the Dutch form of government and army management. 
The writer discusses Dutch army expansions, which has brought her army to 80.000 men 
strong, on paper. However, it is then claimed that the actual strength of the army is only 
50.000 men, and that the remainder of the payments that were supposed to go the other 30.000 
soldiers instead disappeared into the pockets of the „military bourgeoisie‟. Private interests are 
more important to many of the rulers of the Republic than European interest, and this kind of 
governing is bad for the common good (i.e. the balance of power). 
110
 
 Again, these remarks are within a sea of positivity about her power, but they are a 
harbinger of what comes after the Austrian War of Succession. The opinions we can draw 
from the sources after this time seem to be inverted, now becoming either silence or negative 
remarks, with here and there some outnumbered remnants of the former positivity. What 
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exactly causes this quite sudden change can‟t be said for sure. Perhaps it was a review of the 
events during the war that showed Europe that the Republic hadn‟t participated much at all 
and wasn‟t interested anymore in bigger European affairs, instead concentrating on preventing 
herself from going under by French or Prussian pressure. Important to note here is that after 
1748, the Dutch Republic wouldn‟t participate in any major European conflict until the 
Revolutionary wars in the 1790s, and wouldn‟t be engaged in another (smaller) war until 
1780. This could explain her general absence from the sources, but we must keep in mind that 
during the earlier years of the Austrian war of Succession and her neutral years before that, 
she tried to remain neutral as well, and yet was subject to debate and discussions about the 
war, the balance of power and how the Republic should get involved in order to maintain that 
balance. 
 Once again, let‟s return to Bielfeld, writing in 1774. His words decently illustrate what 
others say about the subject as well. Bielfeld notes that the Republic always kept only a small 
army in peacetime, too small to defend her land borders. Even the expansions of the army 
during the Austrian War of Succession were quite useless, as her soldiers were badly trained 
due to various reasons. Her form of government isn‟t helping either, with the elite exchanging 
high-ranking positions such as army officers without considering skill or abilities. The 
Republic isn‟t able to change her position either: she is simply too small to sustain an army 
larger than 60.000 to 80.000 men, which is much smaller than other European armies.
111
 In 
general, Bielfeld accuses the Dutch government of having become decadent and malicious to 
her own interests. A little later on he mentions that the only reason the Republic hasn‟t been 
conquered by France, is because the rest of Europe doesn‟t want to see that happen.112 This is 
quite an overturn from what we saw previously, where the Dutch were considered to be able 
to defend themselves, albeit with alliances, and their contribution to the Austrian War of 
Succession was thought of as decent. A French book from 1777 discussing „several powers‟ 
in Europe, doesn‟t pay much attention to the Dutch Republic in the European system, but 
importantly says that if France would desire so, she could conquer territories all the way up to 
the Rhine. This implies that the Republic wouldn‟t be able to stop her from doing so, with or 
without European help.
113
 Another French book from 1779 also discusses the Republic and 
recalls a time where she was more powerful, but is now unable to be so. She lacks the money 
to provide for a sufficient army and therefore cannot exert any power, and the only reason she 
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still exists is because the she remains quiet and at peace with many other European states. 
Thus, her existence is to be thanked to diplomacy instead of power.
114
 
 The remarks of a weak Republic compared to her former glory generally seem to 
happen a bit later in time than our second argument, the decay of the social-constructivist 
elements that had made the Republic powerful in European eyes. This starts very shortly after 
the Austrian War of Succession. In a treatise discussing the peace terms of the treaty of Aix-
La-Chapelle we see the complaint that the Dutch barrier is gone, and that it is feared that the 
Republic will come under French influence. Restoration of the barrier is extremely expensive, 
and the writer is aware that the Republic is unable to make that kind of money available for 
this restoration. So in this treatise, the vulnerability of the Republic and the bad condition of 
her finances are noted.
115
 A series of books discussing the interests of European powers notes 
in 1751 that the Dutch army and Navy had been weakening since the end of the Spanish War 
of Succession because of a compulsive desire for peace, resulting in a weak, indecisive army 
in the Austrian War of Succession and fluctuating and irregular behavior from a government 
which could not be relied upon, which was to the detriment of the allies and of profit to 
France.
116
  Reading this particular source, one gets the feeling that the weakness of the 
Republic was very suddenly uncovered within the last few years of the Austrian War of 
Succession. A 1758 Treatise discusses French plans for Europe in British eyes, in which the 
Dutch Republic mostly seems to be considered a pawn on the chessboard of Europe, and not a 
player, saying that France more or less has the Republic under her thumb.
117
 Especially 
because the barrier no longer functioned since the Franco-Austrian alliance of 1756, the 
Republic had little other choice than to stay quiet and keep out of affairs that could put her at 
risk of a war with France.
118
 This points us to something quite important. In the same treatise 
it is also acknowledged that: 
 
‘...for Holland is not any more to us, what she formerly was, the faithful friend and ally of 
Great Britain’.119 
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Here we clearly see the breaking down of the „Old System‟ of alliances. Austria  will 
no longer protect the barrier because of the alliance with France, and apparently the Republic 
and Great Britain are also drifting apart. The Republic is weakened and according to the 
writer sees Great Britain as a dangerous competitor to her trade, instead of a sister nation.
120
 
So here we see clearly that the Old System is no more, and that obviously is detrimental to the 
Republic. Without her alliances, she is unable to act in the face of a French threat, which 
could certainly be an argument for why she is no longer a great power at this time. 
 As said before, the relative absence from the discussion also tells us something about 
how Europe thought about the Dutch Republic and her power. A French book from 1757 for 
example considers the European system. In the text the important powers of Europe are 
mentioned. Great Britain, Austria, and France are most important, the Republic no longer 
being mentioned amongst those important to the balance. It is also said that these powers can 
divide Europe amongst themselves if they like, which also implies that the Republic would be 
open for conquest.
121
 This is just one example among more, but it serves as enough to 
illustrate the argument of silence about the Republic. 
 Thus the decay has become clear. Already shortly before the end of the Austrian War 
of Succession did some writers have their doubts about Dutch power. What should be noted 
here is that we see some objectivist argumentation here: the authors complained about the size 
of the army contributions to the Austrian War of Succession but also about the Dutch army in 
general, which was by that time relatively small compared to the rest of Europe. We also saw 
some complaints about the quality of the army, which was apparently poorly trained, and the 
generals reluctant to actually engage in combat. 
After the Austrian War of Succession, then, we clearly see the breaking down of many 
of the social-constructivist arguments that made the Republic appear powerful before the 
middle of the century. Her prestige seems to have been tarnished by what writers after the 
Austrian War of Succession saw as poor performance during that war. The Old System too 
found her end: Great Britain grew more and more powerful on her own, and in 1756 the 
Franco-Austrian alliance put an end to the relevance of the barrier. As France had been 
exhausted by the Austrian War of Succession, at least temporarily, the common enemy of the 
Old System also faded away. The alliance broke apart, and the Republic was more or less 
defenseless against France once she would regain her strength. The Republic also didn‟t take 
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part in any more big European conflicts until the revolutionary wars in the 1790s. Her once 
wise government is now stamped as misgovernment, causing further weakness. In just a 
decade or so, the European optimistic opinion of Dutch power collapses entirely, soon writing 
her off as an irrelevant state that can only passively matter to the balance, as in having a rich 
trade, a possible conqueror of which could use to become richer and more powerful. Her 
glaring weakness would show during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war (1780-1784), when a war 
with what had been a close ally for over a century would prove disastrous to the Republic. 
With these observations we have all parts of the puzzle for the contemporary opinion: 
the Dutch opinion, which is already very negative early on and the European opinion, which 
starts out as positive but quite abruptly turns sour as major changes take place that for once 
and for all remove the Dutch Republic from the position of a great power in Europe. 
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Conclusion: New definitions? 
 
Considering all that we‟ve seen above, it is easy to see that the current academic debate about 
the Dutch Republic as a great power is lacking crucial information, and should not be 
continued in its current form. Not to say that the objectivist arguments often cited there are 
invalid: quite the opposite, they still significantly mattered in the contemporary opinions on 
Dutch power and power in general, as we saw in the example of Bielfeld. In the first chapter 
about Dutch pessimism we also saw these objectivist arguments return in complaints about 
the army, navy and economy. But, social-constructivist arguments also played a role, as her 
alliances and government were also viewed as reasons the Republic was weak. Even more 
social-constructivist arguments appeared when we looked at the European opinion of Dutch 
power. They saw the Republic as powerful much longer than the Dutch themselves, because 
of her past military achievements and her participation in the Old System, the significance of 
her barrier and her government, which was perceived as wise, independent and strong. 
 The decay of the Dutch great power status in contemporary European eyes was also 
very clearly visible. Her reputation was tarnished, the Old System fell apart due to her 
neutrality and the renversement d’alliances between Austria, France and Great-Britain, and 
the barrier no longer functioned either. Wise government was now seen as misgovernment, 
resulting in a weak army, a weak navy and neutrality politics. One of the few positive things 
the Republic is still credited with after this time is her rich trade. Besides this however, she 
disappeared from our sources as an active player on the European chessboard, becoming a 
pawn instead. 
 What we can conclude from the contemporary debate is that the Dutch were 
pessimistic about their power, and most considered the Republic‟s status as a great power in 
Europe to be gone after the Spanish War of Succession. Many of the reasons for this 
pessimism were objectivist in nature, much like the modern debate, which also sees most 
supporters for a loss of Great power status around the same time. For the Dutch opinion on 
the decay of great power status, 1713 and the Treaty of Utrecht seems a fitting endpoint. 
However, the European opinion on the power of the Dutch Republic remained high for much 
longer, at least until the Austrian War of Succession, followed by a rapid decline of this 
opinion. These findings thus support a very late decay of great power status. If we have to 
attach a year to this type of decay, it should probably be 1756, for the same reason Olaf van 
Nimwegen has argued in our first chapter, namely because that was the year the Old System 
truly came to an end and the barrier lost its significance. By that year then, most of the 
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important social-constructivist arguments that once argued for a powerful Republic could no 
longer be supported. 
 Thus now we seem to be in more trouble than when this paper started, now perhaps 
having two different dates for the loss of „great power‟ status for the Dutch Republic: 1713 
when the modern and contemporary Dutch objectivist reasoning is maintained, 1756 when 
European contemporary social-constructivist reasoning is also brought into the equation. To 
find a synthesis between this is quite difficult, given the objectivist arguments that are 
currently attached to great power status. According to modern criteria, the Republic can‟t ever 
have been a great power. But with those criteria neither Great Britain nor Austria would be 
great powers either, given the fact that they apparently required alliances and foreign policies 
to accommodate these alliances to win a fight against France, often also including the 
Republic. France, then, could perhaps be the only great power in Europe at the time. And 
even this might not be so certain: in both the Austrian and Spanish Wars of Succession she 
herself had various allies fighting alongside her, so we may ask ourselves if she could truly 
fight her wars all alone. Thus by objectivist definitions, there might not have been any great 
powers in Europe, which would render the term obsolete. 
 Now we might have found a problem that causes the debate about the Dutch Republic 
as great power to be so broad and diverse. The very definitions and criteria for great power 
status are unhelpful in their current form. As observed in this paper, many criteria 
contemporary writers thought of as important for being a great power are left out. To solve 
this issue, the requirements for great power status need to be amended with social-
constructivist criteria, while the objectivist criteria should be nuanced to allow for alliances 
and alliance-accommodating foreign policies. Of course we can‟t stick criteria such as the 
barrier or the wise government of the Republic on our definitions of a great power. Rather, we 
should look at the effects these criteria had. This is where we get back to the balance of 
power. 
Given the fact that it was such an important concept at the time, and many of the 
social-constructivist arguments we saw were rooted in their effect on the European balance of 
power, perhaps we should add a state‟s ability to influence the balance of power as a criteria 
for being a great power in the eighteenth century. Doing so would settle three important 
problems: first of all, this would add an important contemporary social-constructivist criterion 
to definitions that lack both the contemporary and the social-constructivist angle. Secondly, it 
would solve the aforementioned problem of no European state in the eighteenth century fitting 
the current definitions. After all, France, Great Britain and Austria, states that around the 
53 
 
middle of the century are often seen as great powers, were indeed able to significantly 
influence the balance, restoring them to great power status if the balance of power criterion is 
added to our criteria. Thirdly, the Republic then can also be counted among the great powers 
until at least the end of the Austrian war of Succession in 1748, and at the latest until 1756,  
thus placing the loss of great power status somewhere in a period of merely 8 years, instead of 
over 80 years, as in the modern debate we know today. 
One could counter-argue that this too is problematic given the fact that the balance of 
power was considered to be made up of smaller balances, in which smaller states could have 
enough effect to affect a regional balance, and in consequence the general balance.
122
 Perhaps 
a counter for this would be that a state cannot be considered a great power if it cannot affect 
the general balance directly. But of course, new definitions and criteria will always lead to 
new debates about inclusion and exclusion of various states from great power status. The 
proposed changes therefore aren‟t just educated suggestions, but also invitations to further 
debate, especially from the social-constructivist angle, which is something our current 
definitions of power, great power, and the Dutch Republic as a great power certainly need. 
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